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Abstract
The rise of the popularity of cryptocurrencies in the last few years has
sparked international debate as to the characterization of cryptocurrencies and
tokens issued by ICOs. The decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies and ICOs
raises fundamental challenges as to the parties and tokens that should be
regulated and how they should be regulated. This Article proposes that tokens
which are similar to securities should be regulated like securities. Under
Australian law, this Article proposes that digital currencies should be categorized
as financial products with the exception of utility tokens. Entities issuing ICOs
and cryptocurrency exchanges should be subject to disclosure regimes in order for
cryptocurrency purchasers to receive a prospectus or product disclosure
statement. Additionally, this Article suggests that issuing entities have ongoing
obligations to maintain the security of such platforms.
I. Introduction
Over the last few years, the exponential rise of the value of
cryptocurrencies, the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (“DAO”) attack,
and the total worldwide raising of US$3.6 billion in Initial Coin Offerings (“ICOs”) 1
have provoked international debates on the legal status of cryptocurrencies and
tokens issued in ICOs.
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1. Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Douglas W. Arner & Linus Fohr, The ICO Gold Rush: It’s A Scam,
It’s A Bubble, It’s A Super Challenge For Regulators 1, 19 (Univ. of Lux., Law Working Paper No. 2017-011,
2017), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3072298##.
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The decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies and ICOs raises fundamental
regulatory challenges of who to regulate, what type of tokens to regulate, and how
to regulate the tokens. This Article posits that the structure of a securities offering
does not change the substance of the transaction, so the regulation of
cryptocurrencies that are closer in nature to securities is essential to ensure proper
disclosure. 2 However, since different cryptocurrencies have diverse purposes of use
(such as investment tools, mediums of exchange, and ability to use products and
services on a particular platform), it can be difficult to characterize
cryptocurrencies without overstepping the boundaries of securities regulation.
Even if such regulatory challenges are overcome and regulations are introduced,
such regulations will be difficult to enforce due to the anonymity of cryptocurrency
transactions and the cross-jurisdictional nature of trading digital currencies and
tokens over the Internet.
Despite the inevitable challenges of enforcing any regulatory regime on
digital currencies and ICOs, this Article recommends three aspects of regulation
which should clarify regulatory uncertainty for participants and protect
consumers against the risks of investing in cryptocurrencies and tokens. First,
digital currencies should be specifically recognized as financial products under the
Australian Corporations Act 2001 (the “Corporations Act”) 3 with a carveout for
utility tokens. Second, a disclosure regime should apply to both the entity behind
the ICO and the cryptocurrency exchanges so that all purchasers of
cryptocurrencies receive prospectuses or product disclosure statements. Such
disclosure statements should include disclosure of the platform’s underlying code
and the security measures in place to protect against cyberattacks.4 Lastly,
financial services law must require the entity behind the ICO and secondary
exchanges to have ongoing obligations to maintain the security of their platforms.
This Article is divided into three parts. Part II examines the current status
of regulation of cryptocurrencies and ICOs. Part III discusses for and against
cryptocurrency regulation under Australian financial services laws. Lastly, Part
IV recommends how existing laws can be amended to regulate cryptocurrencies
and ICOs.

2. See Jay Clayton, Chairman, SEC, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 13, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/12/13/state
ment-on-cryptocurrencies-and-initial-coin-offerings/.
3. See generally Corporations Act 2001 (Austl.).
4. Philipp Hacker & Chris Thomale, Crypto-Securities Regulation: ICOs, Token Sales and
Cryptocurrencies
Under
EU
Financial
Law
1,
41
(Nov.
11,
2017),
available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3075820 (discussing developers’ tendency to voluntarily
disclose code).
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II. Current Status of Regulation of Cryptocurrencies and ICOs
A. What Are Cryptocurrencies and ICOs?
Cryptocurrency is a type of digital currency that operates on distributed
ledger technology known as blockchain.5 Blockchain is a decentralized system that
does not rely on central administering authorities to verify transactions and is a
peer-to-peer network where all users have a real-time copy of the ledger, and can
view every transaction which has occurred on the blockchain.6 Users buying
cryptocurrencies can trade anonymously, although there has been research
indicating that public keys can be linked to the identity of forty percent of Bitcoin
users.7 The cryptocurrencies that are major players in the market are Bitcoin,
Ethereum and Ripple.8
A digital currency was recently defined in the Anti-Money Laundering and
Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Act 2017 as a digital representation of
value that functions as a medium of exchange, a store of economic value or unit of
account, and is not issued under the authority of a government body, and is
interchangeable with money and may be used as consideration for the supply of
goods or services and is generally available to the public without any restriction
on its use as consideration.9 As recognized in this definition, a digital currency
may be used to buy goods or services. However, digital currencies can also be used
for speculative purposes. In fact, recent evidence indicates that more than fifty
percent of users on the well-known digital currency exchange, Coinbase, use
Bitcoin strictly for investment purposes.10 The extreme price volatility suggests
that cryptocurrencies are not primarily used as a medium of exchange.11
An ordinary consumer can buy cryptocurrencies at an exchange by
exchanging their domestic currency for a cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin. 12
Exchanges are secondary markets which can be used to buy, sell and trade
cryptocurrencies for other cryptocurrencies and/or national currencies, and is the

5. See
What
is
Cryptocurrency:
Guide
for
Beginners,
COIN
TELEGRAPH,
https://cointelegraph.com/bitcoin-for-beginners/what-are-cryptocurrencies#history (last visited Mar. 16,
2019).
6. Gerard Comizio, Virtual Currencies: Growing Regulatory Framework and Challenges in the Fintech
Ecosystem, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 133, 134 (2017).
7. Misha Tsukerman, The Block is Hot: A Survey of the State of Bitcoin Regulation and Suggestions
For the Future, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1127, 1137 (2015).
8. Top 100 Cryptocurrencies by Market Capitalizations, COIN MARKET CAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/?
(last visited Mar. 16, 2019).
9. Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Act 2017 (Cth) s 5 (Austl.).
10. DR. GARRICK HILEMAN & MICHEL RAUCHS, CAMBRIDGE CTR. FOR ALT. FIN., UNIV. OF CAMBRIDGE,
GLOBAL CRYPTOCURRENCY BENCHMARKING STUDY 23 (2017).
11. Id.
12. See Florian Glaser, Kai Zimmermann, Martin Haferkorn, Moritz Christian Weber & Michael Siering,
Goethe University, Bitcoin – Asset or Currency? Revealing Users’ Hidden Intentions at 22nd European
Conference on Information Systems, Tel Aviv 5 (2014).
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largest sector in the cryptocurrency environment.13 Tokens issued under ICOs can
also be traded on these exchanges, although they are often listed with “wild price
fluctuations”.14 As the value of cryptocurrencies are not backed by interest rates,
their value is determined purely by supply and demand.15
Cryptocurrencies are often used to buy tokens issued under ICOs. 16 ICOs
are a new method of raising funds over the Internet through the offer and sale of
tokens specifically created and issued on a blockchain for the launching of a
platform usually based on blockchain technology.17 The organization selling the
tokens could be a properly incorporated company or a loosely connected group of
developers18 who do not have a recognized status as a legal entity. The tokens
offered under ICOs have similar “characteristics of a digital voucher and grant the
participants rights of some kind.” 19 Some tokens mainly comprise of an investment
component where buyers are promised positive future cash flows from the
distribution of profits of the created platform, such as the DAO tokens. 20 Other
tokens, known as “utility tokens” provide buyers with “access to a product that the
developers . . . are creating” on the platform.21 An example of a utility token is
Filecoin, “which launched the second-most successful ICO in 2017, collecting more
than $250 million”, and is a decentralized file sharing system allowing users to
spend tokens for storing and accessing files online.22 Finally, ICOs can be used to
create a new cryptocurrency23 and therefore “function as a means of payment for
goods and services external to the platform.”24 For example, the ICO of Ethereum,
launched in 2015, is now worth nearly $100 billion.25
This Articles examines two successful ICOs launched in Australia in 2017,
Power Ledger26 and Canya Coin.27 Power Ledger raised AUD$34 million through
its ICO and aims through its use of POWR tokens to create an energy trading
platform where holders of POWR tokens can sell and buy excess energy from solar
power panels.28 Canya Coin raised AUD$12 million in its ICO for the development
of its peer-to-peer marketplace where coin holders can purchase services provided
HILEMAN & RAUCHS, supra note 10, at 27.
Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings and the
Democratization of Public Capital Markets 1 (Research Paper No. 338, 2017).
15. Glaser et al., supra note 12.
16. See generally Iris M. Barsan, Legal Challenges of Initial Coin Offerings (ICO), 3 CORP. FIN. & CAP.
MARKETS L. REV. 55 (2017).
17. See generally Stephane Blemus, Law and Blockchain: A Legal Perspective on Current Regulatory
Trends Worldwide, 4 CORP. FIN. & CAP. MARKETS L. REV. 3 (2018).
18. See Rohr & Wright, supra note 14, at 18.
19. Zetzsche et al., supra note 1, at 7.
20. Hacker & Thomale, supra note 4, at 13.
21. Id. at 12.
22. Id.
23. See generally Barsan, supra note 16.
24. Hacker & Thomale, supra note 4, at 12.
25. Jeff John Roberts, Ethereum Founder Warns of ICO Scams, FORTUNE (Jan. 4, 2018),
http://fortune.com/2018/01/04/ico-scam/?.
26. See generally POWER LEDGER, https://www.powerledger.io/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2019).
27. See generally CANYA, https://canya.io/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2019).
28. See POWER LEDGER, supra note 26.
13.
14.
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from anywhere in the world using Canya Coin. 29 Both Canya Coin and POWR
tokens are best characterized as utility tokens, since they represent vouchers that
can be used to participate in their respective platforms. As with most tokens issued
under ICOs, Canya Coins and POWR tokens can be traded in secondary markets
on cryptocurrency exchanges.30
ICOs are generally accompanied by white papers, which describe the project
and the structure in which tokens will be used to support it.31 However, ICOs
should not be confused with prospectuses that accompany initial public offerings
(IPOs) since they typically contain far less information about issuing entities than
prospectuses.32
B. Existing Regulations
The regulatory status of both cryptocurrencies and ICOs around the world
is unclear. Cryptocurrencies have been characterized by regulators as
“commodities”, “movable property or . . . property for tax reasons.”33 Countries are
reluctant to recognize digital currency as legal tender or currency, except Japan
which “enacted a law authorizing the use of virtual currencies as a legal method
of payment . . . from April 2017.”34 Some judges in the United States have
characterized Bitcoin as a currency or form of money. 35 However, there is no
consistency among U.S. states in the treatment of cryptocurrencies.36 Notably,
New York introduced the BitLicense regime in 2015 which requires virtual
currency businesses to obtain a license from the New York Department of
Financial Services to operate a virtual currency exchange, transmission, custody
or trading services in New York.37 By creating a new and separate licensing
framework, New York's BitLicense regime does not need to classify virtual
currencies as either a form of currency or security in order to make it subject to
existing regulations.
No European Union (“EU”) legislation exists yet on virtual currencies, and
no specific regulations have been adopted by any of the EU Member States. 38
See CANYA, supra note 27.
See CanYa White Paper, CANYA 13, available at https://canya.io/assets/docs/WhitePaper.pdf; see
Power Ledger Disclosure Document, POWER LEDGER 10, available at https://powerledger.io/media/Power29.
30.

Ledger-TGE-Disclosure-Document-v1.3.pdf.
31. Zetzsche et al., supra note 1, at 10.
32. Id.
33. See Barsan, supra note 16.
34. Blemus, supra note 17, at 4.
35. SEC v. Shavers No. 4:13- CV 416 (2014).
36. Justin Wales & Matthew Kohen, United States: State Regulations on Virtual Currency and
Blockchain Technologies, MONDAQ, http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/645308/fin+tech/State+Regula
tions+On+Virtual+Currency+And+Blockchain+Technologies (last visited Mar. 19, 2019).
37. See New York State Department of Financial Services, Chapter 1: Regulations of the Superintendent
of Financial Services, Part 200. Virtual Currencies, https://www.dfs.ny.gov/apps_and_licensing/virtual
_currency_businesses.
38. See Blemus, supra note 17, at 7.
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Under EU case law, the European Court of Justice decided that Bitcoins resemble
instruments of payment rather than securities, and therefore, be exempt from
prospectus regulation.39 However, the German Regulator, the Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) has recognized even the currency
components of cryptocurrencies to be securities so that the commercial use and
trading of cryptocurrencies would be considered as financial services. 40
The Australian securities regulator, the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission (“ASIC”), has taken the view that digital currencies do
not fall within the legal definition of either financial products or currency. 41 ASIC
believes that digital currencies are commodities since “the definition of ‘making a
financial investment’ does not include real property or bullion and . . . similarly
[does] not include digital currencies.”42 “ASIC also considers that a digital currency
is not a facility through which a person makes a non-cash payment [because]
[d]igital currencies do not afford the holder any rights to make payments using
the digital currency or redeem it for cash.” 43 Therefore, for the purposes of section
763A of the Corporations Act, ASIC believes that digital currencies are not
financial products and not subject to Australian financial services regulation.44
ASIC did, however, recognize that some digital currency offerings may be financial
products, including derivatives offered over digital currencies, and facilities which
enable digital currency holders to pay for goods or services using digital currencies
which could be providing a non-cash payment facility.45
ASIC did not provide any reasons for why it likened digital currencies to
real property or bullion. Cryptocurrencies are not easily comparable to real
property or bullion because of cryptocurrency’s different features and purposes of
use. There is a strong argument that for some cryptocurrencies such as Ether,
buyers give their money’s worth to another person (e.g., the Ethereum
foundation46) to generate a financial return47 to fall within the meaning of “making
a financial investment”.48 It also seems odd that ASIC did not consider digital
currencies to be non-cash payment facilities, considering cryptocurrencies are
usually used as payment to buy tokens under ICOs and there are a number of
companies such as Microsoft, Reddit and Virgin Galactic that accept payments in

39. Hacker & Thomale, supra note 4, at 13.
40. Barsan, supra note 16, at 59.
41. Inquiry into Digital Currency, Submission 44 to Senate Economic References Committee, Austl. Sec.
& Investments Comm’n 1, 11 (2014).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 763A (Austl.).
45. Inquiry into Digital Currency, Submission 44 to Senate Economic References Committee, Austl. Sec.
& Investments Comm’n 1, 15 (2014).
46. See generally ETHEREUM, https://ethereum.org/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2019).
47. See Hadar Jabotinsky, The Regulation of Cryptocurrencies between a Currency and a Financial
Product 1, 24 (Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem Legal Studies Research Paper Series No 18-10, 2018).
48. See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 763B (Austl.).
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bitcoin.49 Considering ASIC took this view in 2014, before the time of ICOs, this
Article recommends that digital currencies not be regulated as financial products.
Regulatory uncertainty also exists on the status of tokens issued under
ICOs, particularly whether or not they should be regarded as securities. Most
regulators have stated that anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism
financing regulations will apply to ICOs,50 just as many jurisdictions have
forthcoming amendments to regulate cryptocurrency exchanges under money
laundering and terrorist financing laws.51 With the exception of South Korea and
China which have outright banned ICOs,52 most regulators have issued warnings
targeted at consumers which highlight the risks of investing in ICOs and state
that due to ICOs being largely unregulated, investors will have no recourse or
protection if they lose their money.53 As to whether or not tokens under ICOs
should be considered securities, regulators have taken a no-size-fits-all regulatory
approach. Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore and Switzerland have each
taken an approach similar to that taken by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”).54
The SEC’s approach is evident in its declaration in July 2017 that the DAO
tokens were securities under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 and that the DAO, an
unincorporated organization, was the issuer of those securities.55 The DAO was a
decentralized crowdsourcing vehicle on the Ethereum blockchain launched on
April 30, 2016.56 It raised over $150 million from more than $11,000 in its ICO.57
The creators of the DAO wrote smart contract code allowing the DAO to function,
and for investors to collectively vote on proposals for funding projects based on
their ownership of DAO tokens.58 It was anticipated that the earnings from the
projects would be distributed to the DAO token holders. 59 The DAO was

49. Jonas Chokun, Who Accepts Bitcoins as Payment? List of Companies, Stores, Shops, 99 BITCOINS,
https://99bitcoins.com/who-accepts-bitcoins-payment-companies-stores-take-bitcoins/? (updated Sep. 13,
2018).
50. See Zetzsche et al., supra note 1, at 24.
51. See David Meyer, Here’s When Europe’s New Bitcoin Rules Come into Effect, FORTUNE (Dec. 4, 2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/12/04/eu-bitcoin-anti-money-laundering-uk/.
52. Zetzsche et al., supra note 1, at 59.
53. See id. at 30.
54. Blemus, supra note 17, at 10.
55. Report of Investigation pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO,
Exchange Act Release No. 81207, 16 (July 25, 2017).
56. See Gideon Greenspan, Smart Contracts and the DAO Implosion: The Tragic Combination of
Inevitable Bugs and Immutable Code, MULTICHAIN (June 22, 2016), https://www.multichain.com/blog/
2016/06/smart-contracts-the-dao-implosion/; David Siegel, Understanding the DAO Attack, COINDESK (June
25, 2016), https://www.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hack-journalists/.
57. Siegel, supra note 56.
58. Andrew Hinkes, The Law of the DAO, COINDESK (May 19, 2016), https://www.coindesk.com/the-lawof-the-dao.
59. Report of Investigation pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO,
Exchange Act Release No. 81207, 4 (July 25, 2017).
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infamously hacked by a hacker who managed to drain the DAO of $70 million by
taking advantage of a vulnerability in the code. 60
The SEC found that the DAO tokens were securities because they were
investment contracts.61 The DAO tokens satisfied the criteria to be investment
contracts because (i) the token holders had invested money’s worth (i.e., Ether);
(ii) a reasonable investor had a reasonable expectation of profits on their
investment of Ether in the DAO; (iii) investors’ profits were to be derived from the
managerial efforts of others, specifically the DAO’s curators who exercised
significant control over the order and frequency of proposals and could exercise
discretion over which proposals would be put to a vote; and (iv) the DAO token
holders were geographically dispersed, limited in their ability to communicate
with each other and had limited voting rights comparable to that of corporate
shareholders.62
The SEC emphasized that “whether or not a particular transaction involves
the offer and sale of a security . . . will depend on the facts and circumstances,
including the economic realities of the transaction.”63 This view has been taken by
other regulators. For example, ASIC’s guidance on ICOs states that the legal
status of an ICO is dependent on the ICO’s structure and operations and the rights
attached to the tokens offered under the ICO. 64 For example, ASIC has stated that
tokens under an ICO could be an offer of shares, units in a managed investment
scheme, derivatives or non-cash payment facilities. 65
However, the SEC’s approach does not provide much clarity on what other
tokens would qualify as securities, particular those that differ in design from the
DAO, such as utility tokens.66 A subsequent statement by SEC Chairman, Jay
Clayton, indicates that the emphasis of secondary market trading potential of
tokens by promoters where prospective purchasers are being sold with the intent
for the tokens to increase in value and the ability to resell them were key
indicators of a securities offering.67 This suggests that the SEC would likely treat
utility tokens that have been expressly promoted under its ICO as having
secondary market trading potential as securities. Yet, U.S. regulators’ positions
could still evolve or change if regulations are enacted. 68 The SEC’s declaration on
60. Antonio Madeira, The DAO, the Hack, the Soft Fork and the Hard Fork, CRYPTO COMPARE (Sep. 28,
2017), https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/the-dao-the-hack-the-soft-fork-and-the-hard-fork/.
61. Report of Investigation pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO,
Exchange Act Release No. 81207, 11 (July 25, 2017). “An investment contract is an investment of money in a
common enterprise with a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of others.” Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 17.
64. See Initial Coin Offerings and Crypto-Assets Info 225, AUSTL. SEC. & INVESTMENTS COMM’N, available
at
https://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/digital-transformation/initial-coin-offerings-and-crypto-assets/
(last visited Mar. 19, 2019).
65. Id.
66. Hacker & Thomale, supra note 4, at 6.
67. Clayton, supra note 2.
68. See Blemus, supra note 17, at 10.
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DAO tokens does not eliminate the need for ICO developers and investors to
carefully analyze the purpose of issuing the tokens and the rights attached to the
tokens to determine if securities laws will apply to the particular ICO.
III. Why Cryptocurrencies and ICOs Should Be Regulated
under Australian Financial Services Laws
A. Reasons for Regulation
In the absence of regulation under a country’s securities laws, ICOs will
generally be regulated by such country’s consumer protection legislation.69 For
example, Australian consumer law guarantees that misleading and deceptive
conduct prohibitions and general laws regarding fraud in Australia would still
apply.70 The difference, however, between a consumer and an investor, as
explained by the Wallis Report, is that a seller of a product or service usually
guarantees the performance of what they sell, whereas an issuer does not
guarantee performance, so the investor is paid for taking the risk that the capital
paid will not be returned, will not earn income, or both. 71 Therefore, for tokens
offered under ICOs that do not guarantee performance, their investment-like
features should be regulated under securities laws, which offer disclosure regimes
and compensation arrangements which consumer law does not.
The key argument for regulating cryptocurrency and tokens under
securities law is that a change in the structure of a securities offering does not
change the fundamental point that when a security is being offered, securities
laws must be followed.72 This requires the recognition that cryptocurrencies and
tokens are closer in nature to securities than legal currency.
Cryptocurrencies should be regulated as securities rather than legal
currency for the following reasons. First, evidence suggests that most people buy
cryptocurrencies for investment purposes, rather than for use as methods of
payment.73 Second, “high price volatility of virtual currencies is not related to
economic or financial factors, and impedes their ability to serve as a reliable store
of value.”74 Third, “virtual currencies are not an independent unit of account
because they do not measure the value of goods and services directly;” rather, “they
represent the value of goods and services measured” by legal currency based on an
exchange rate.75 Furthermore, if tokens under ICOs were treated like legal
currency, they would not be subject to much existing regulation, as the
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Zetzsche et al., supra note 1, at 21.

Id.

Dimity Kingsford Smith, ASIC Regulation for the Investor as Consumer, 29 CSLJ 327, 333 (2011).
Clayton, supra note 2.
HILEMAN & RAUCHS, supra note 10, at 23.
See generally Barsan, supra note 16; Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Financier (RTDF), n° 3, 57 (2017).
See generally Barsan, supra note 16; Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Financier (RTDF), n° 3, 57 (2017).
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government is the party which issues money.76 Consequently, although it is
undeniable that cryptocurrencies have some currency-like features, their
recognition as securities would provide the best protection to consumers.
Regulation which imposes disclosure requirements on cryptocurrencies
which are closer in nature to financial products is essential, particularly due to
the problems of asymmetric information and a consumer’s lack of ability to assess
the financial product and cybersecurity risks with cryptocurrencies. Imposing a
disclosure regime before cryptocurrencies are sold to consumers and before tokens
are issued under an ICO will ensure market integrity. Particularly where the
value of cryptocurrencies is so volatile and affected by changes in demand,
regulation under securities laws will help ensure that the price of cryptocurrencies
reflects the information that has been provided about them through the disclosure
regimes.
Regulating ICOs under a prospectus regime which sets out information
which must be disclosed to investors is essential for fixing the existing information
asymmetry of ICOs. Research indicates that in many ICOs “potential participants
are given so little financial information that their decision to fund the ICO cannot
be based on a rational calculus.”77 Nearly a quarter of ICO white papers fail to
convey any information at all about the issuing entity, and in almost a third of
the cases, the author of the white paper is different from the entity specified as
the ICO’s issuer.78 Without basic information about the entity standing behind the
ICO, investors are not able to take legal action against them.
A disclosure regime for cryptocurrencies and ICOs would help inform
investors on the risks of trading so that they can make informed decisions as to
whether to invest. In addition to the usual risks of a speculative investment, a
significant risk of buying cryptocurrencies and tokens under an ICO is
cybersecurity.79 ICOs are frequently the target of cyberattacks and without proper
disclosure rules, investors sometimes pay for tokens that are left with nothing. 80
For example, vulnerabilities in the DAO’s code allowed the attacker to drain the
DAO of $70 million.81 Cryptocurrency exchanges are also highly vulnerable to
cybersecurity problems, with one 2013 study showing that over twenty-two
percent of exchanges had experienced security breaches, forcing fifty-six percent
of exchanges to go out of business.82 An infamous example is Mt. Gox—the world’s
largest bitcoin exchange which collapsed in 2014 because its platform was hacked
and approximately 750,000 of its customer’s bitcoins had been stolen. 83
76. See generally Barsan, supra note 16; Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Financier (RTDF), n° 3, 59 (2017).
77. Zetzsche et al., supra note 1, at 15.
78. Id.
79. See generally Barsan, supra note 16; Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Financier (RTDF), n° 3, 55 (2017).
80. Jabotinsky, supra note 47, at 4.
81. Siegel, supra note 56.
82. HILEMAN & RAUCHS, supra note 10, at 36.
83. Darryn Pollock, The Mess That Was Mt Gox: Four Years On, COIN TELEGRAPH (Mar. 9, 2018),
https://cointelegraph.com/news/the-mess-that-was-mt-gox-four-years-on.
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A prospectus regime for an ICO would be able to mandate the disclosure of the
code underlying the platform (if it is not is open source) and information on how
the platform would manage crises, detect bugs and resolve any vulnerabilities in
the code.84 Similarly, disclosure statements by cryptocurrency exchanges could
highlight key risks of buying cryptocurrencies from such exchanges, such as risk
of cyberattacks.
However, it can also be argued that disclosure regimes are ineffective at
informing investors of the risks associated with investing in cryptocurrencies and
tokens. Most retail investors do not read prospectuses or product disclosure
statements.85 ASIC’s recent report on prospectuses indicates “most retail investors
feel comfortable ignoring large sections of the [prospectus]” and prospectuses are
challenging because they are lengthy and too technical or legalistic. 86 In fact, in
ASIC’s study, “some retail investors only mentioned the prospectus when
prompted by the researcher, suggesting that it may not have had a significant
influence on their investment decision.”87
Yet, mandating a disclosure regime for ICOs should have some effect on
protecting retail investors from information asymmetry and ICO scams. “A recent
study found that the best predictor for the success of a token sale is the quality of
the white paper,” indicating that investors do seek and value substantial
information on token sales.88 Furthermore, ASIC has the power to issue a stop
order to prevent the offer, issue, sale or transfer of securities where a prospectus
lodged with ASIC contains a misleading or deceptive statement or where there has
been an omission of information required to be provided under the legislation. 89
ASIC’s power to prevent an IPO from taking place in these circumstances would
act as a screening mechanism to minimize fraudulent or negligent ICOs being
offered to the public. While ASIC does not review every disclosure document for
compliance,90 this Article recommends, considering the new and untested nature
of ICOs, ASIC should review all ICO white papers that are lodged with ASIC to
ensure maximum protection for retail investors.
Regulation of cryptocurrencies under financial services laws would also
protect consumers against poorly run cryptocurrency exchanges. If these
exchanges are unregulated and have dishonest “business practices and fail, the
consumer bears the risk of non-payment and the loss of investment.” 91 However,
recognizing cryptocurrencies and tokens as securities will require cryptocurrency
84. Hacker & Thomale, supra note 4, at 40.
85. Jabotinsky, supra note 47, at 25.
86. Investors in Initial Public Offerings, Report 540, Austl. Sec. & Investments Comm’n 30 (Aug. 31,
2017).
87. Id.
88. Hacker & Thomale, supra note 4, at 43.
89. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 739 (Austl.).
90. Offering Securities under a Disclosure Document, Reg. Guide 254, Austl. Sec. & Investments
Comm’n, 1, 79 (2016).
91. Sean McLeod, Bitcoin: The Utopia or Nightmare of Regulation, 9 ELON L. REV. 553, 570 (2017).
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exchanges to hold an Australian Financial Services License (“AFSL”) or Market
License (“AML”).92 To initially obtain an AFSL or AML and to meet continuing
obligations, an entity must show that it has access to sufficient financial, human
and IT resources to carry out its responsibilities under its license and the law. 93
AFSL or AML applicants must also demonstrate that they have adequate
compensation arrangements, which translates to minimum professional
indemnity insurance.94 This becomes an ongoing obligation to ensure that they are
able to compensate retail clients for losses they suffer as a result of a breach by
the licensee of their obligations under the Corporations Act. 95 ASIC has stated that
its “objective in administering the compensation requirements is to reduce the risk
that a retail client’s losses cannot be compensated by a licensee due to a lack of
financial resources.”96 Therefore, requiring cryptocurrency exchanges to obtain an
AML to operate a cryptocurrency platform in Australia would give assurance to
investors that those exchanges have sufficient financial resources to compensate
them for losses. Investors would be entitled to compensation if a cryptocurrency
exchange breached its obligations to “do all things necessary to ensure that [its]
financial services . . . are provided efficiently, honestly and fairly.” 97
It is worth considering self-regulation of cryptocurrencies as an alternative
to regulation under financial services laws. A voluntary code of conduct (“Code”)
for Australian digital currency businesses has been developed by the Australian
Digital Commerce Association (“ADCA”).98 This Code allows digital currency
businesses to seek certification by the ADCA by subscribing to the Code which acts
as a contract between the ADCA and the digital currency business. The Code
details consumer protections such as requiring businesses to adopt specified
security measures to maintain the security of their systems, maintaining
membership of an external dispute resolution scheme, and maintaining
professional indemnity insurance of at least $1 million.99
The Code, however, does not obligate businesses to provide disclosure
statements regarding the risks of purchasing cryptocurrency nor does it prohibit
an AML holder from having a conflict of duty.100 As financial products,
92. Inquiry into Digital Currency, Submission 44 to Senate Economic References Committee, Austl. Sec.
& Investments Comm’n 23 (2014).
93. See id.; see also eLicensing: Sample Application, “List of All Questions That May be Asked in the
AFS License Application”, AUSTL. SEC. & INVESTMENTS COMM’N, available at http://download.asic.gov.au/med
ia/4501249/elicensing-sample-application-september-2017.pdf; see also Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s
912A(1)(d) (Austl.).
94. eLicensing, supra note 93, at 41.
95. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 912B (Austl.).
96. Compensation and Insurance Arrangements for AFS Licensees, Reg. Guide 125, Austl. Sec. &
Investments Comm’n 9 (Aug. 29, 2017).
97. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 912A (Austl.).
98. See generally Australian Digital Currency Industry Code of Conduct, Austl. Digital Commerce Ass’n
(July 31, 2017).
99. Id.
100. Id.; see also Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 792A (Austl.).
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cryptocurrencies should attract at least the same level of regulation as existing
financial products under the Corporations Act. For these reasons, and for the
obvious reason that voluntary industry codes of conduct are less effective to
enforce because they are not binding under the law, cryptocurrencies would still
be best regulated through amendments to Australia’s financial services laws.
Furthermore, when issues arising from the cross-border nature of
cryptocurrencies require international coordination, having formal regulatory
oversight of cryptocurrency businesses would make ASIC’s dialogue with other
countries’ regulators more effective. However, the voluntary Code could
complement any future statutory obligations on cryptocurrency businesses and
ASIC could administer the Code in the same way that it administers the ePayments Code.
Lastly, regulation will clarify the legal status of cryptocurrencies. Settling
the uncertainty of the legal status of cryptocurrencies and tokens would be
beneficial to innovation and provide clarity to developers as to the extent of their
regulatory obligations when issuing an ICO. Currently, developers face significant
risks of either choosing to disregard securities regulations altogether and being
“vulnerable to prospectus liability” and potentially sued if the tokens are found to
be securities, or they may decide to comply with various countries’ securities
regulations which entails significant delay and compliance costs.101 Clarifying
cryptocurrencies’ legal statuses would ensure that ICO developers and
cryptocurrency exchanges can better structure their businesses and assess their
compliance costs, and will not be vulnerable to fines and even imprisonment for
issuing or trading tokens in breach of the Corporations Act. It would also provide
more clarity to consumers on the exact nature of the tokens they are purchasing.
Both the white papers of Canya and Power Ledger cite one of the risks of buying
their tokens as the uncertain regulatory status and that any change in regulations
could significantly impact the operation and development of their respective
platforms.102 Certainty in their legal statuses would help consumers make more
informed decisions on whether to buy Canya Coins and POWR tokens.
Furthermore, as the value of cryptocurrencies and tokens are directly linked to
demand, “clarifying the regulatory approach to [these cryptocurrencies] could
reduce exchange rate volatility.”103
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B. Challenges of Regulation
The most challenging part of regulating cryptocurrencies and tokens is
determining which tokens would be considered financial products. It does not seem
appropriate to treat all cryptocurrencies as financial products as this would extend
“financial law beyond its natural limits.”104 For example, both Canya and Power
Ledger’s white papers state that their tokens are not offered or structured as
securities, do not grant token holders any ownership rights or rights to receive
dividends, and only grant token holders the right to use their respective
platforms.105 If these tokens were regulated under Australian financial services
laws, then “all license-based business models such as online music stores, software
licenses, etc.” would also be considered financial services businesses “unless
expressly exempted.”106 It has been recognized that consumer law would be better
suited to address the functionality and consumption risks of utility tokens than
securities laws.107
However, the fact that “all utility tokens . . . can be traded on . . . secondary
market can also be sold for profit” suggests that investors could “have an
expectation of profits” when they buy utility tokens issued under ICOs.108 Canya’s
white paper, for example, states that the company intends on having Canya Coins
listed on exchanges and that token holders can choose to use the coins on
exchanges.109 Therefore, it is evident that the profit-making motive of utility
tokens should be regulated under securities laws, particularly when those tokens
are sold on secondary markets. Determining when investment components of
utility tokens should be subject to securities regulation is a key area of uncertainty
recognized by researchers both in the E.U.110 and the United States.111
This Article argues that the investment components of utility tokens should
be regulated under Australian financial services laws, because the risks of buying
utility tokens under ICOs are comparable to the risks listed by ASIC of using noncash payment facilities, which is a type of recognized financial product.112
According to ASIC, a key risk of non-cash payment facilities is that “consumers
will choose inappropriate financial products because they are inadequately
informed about key features of [a non-cash payment] facility, such as an issuer’s
right to unilaterally change the terms and conditions of the product without
notice.”113 This is also a key risk for tokens, since platform developers can also
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unilaterally change the rights attached to utility tokens to use the platform. For
example, Power Ledger’s disclosure document expressly states that Power Ledger
may have to make changes to the specifications of POWR tokens or the platform,
which could result in the POWR tokens not meeting buyers’ expectations at the
time of purchasing the tokens. 114
As the risks of utility tokens resemble those of non-cash payment facilities,
utility tokens could be considered non-cash payment facilities and, therefore,
financial products under Australian financial services law. However, the
Corporations Act provides a carve-out for facilities where “there is only one person
to whom payments can be made.”115 So, a utility token that can only be used within
the particular platform for which it is designed would not technically qualify as a
non-cash payment facility. Nevertheless, the Corporations Act could be amended
to regulate the investment components of utility tokens. In doing so, an
appropriate balance must be struck between regulating a token whose investment
component is only incidental to its utility aspect.
Another significant challenge of regulating cryptocurrencies in any country
is the cross-border nature of cryptocurrencies. In Australia, entities will require
an AML if they are making a financial market in Australia.116 As ASIC has pointed
out, operators and ASIC may not be able to “accurately identify” if cryptocurrency
exchanges and platforms that only operate offshore meet the test for operating a
financial market in Australia;117 particularly since blockchain technology enables
buyers and sellers to trade anonymously, making it difficult for cryptocurrency
exchanges and ICO platforms to determine if the regular users of their platform
are people located in Australia. Perhaps, however, the difficulty of identifying
users’ residencies will be made easier by Australia’s amendments to its AntiMoney Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act of 2016 (the “AML/CTF
Act”),118 which requires cryptocurrency exchanges to conduct customer
identification.
Lastly, cryptocurrencies are difficult to regulate because extending the
application of existing securities regulations to cryptocurrencies does not really
work. Product disclosure obligations do not fit neatly with cryptocurrencies,
because cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, do not have an “identifiable issuer” or
a “centralized authority responsible for their creation.”119 New bitcoins are
automatically issued to miners as a reward for verifying transactions on the

114. See POWER LEDGER DISCLOSURE DOCUMENT, supra note 102, at 8.
115. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 763D (Austl.).
116. Doing Financial Services Business in Australia, Reg. Guide 121, Austl. Sec. & Investments Comm’n
13 (July 30, 2013).
117. Inquiry into Digital Currency, Submission 44 to Senate Economic References Committee, Austl. Sec.
& Investments Comm’n 23 (2014).
118. See generally Anti‑Money Laundering and Counter‑Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Austl.).
119. Inquiry into Digital Currency, Submission 44 to Senate Economic References Committee, Austl. Sec.
& Investments Comm’n 24 (2014).
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blockchain.120 The difficulty and expense of mining bitcoin has given rise to mining
pools consisting of individuals who work together to mine bitcoin and the promoter
of the pool who combines the work product of these individuals to generate
profits.121 “Miners [or promoters of mining pools] who acquire new units of bitcoin
with the purpose of selling or transferring it, and who do so within one year of
acquiring the bitcoin, may be required to prepare and provide a [product disclosure
statement] to the person to whom they sell the bitcoin.”122 This obligation would,
however, be difficult to enforce, particularly if mining pools are comprised of
miners from different countries and are trading anonymously. It would also mean
that not all purchasers of cryptocurrencies would receive a product disclosure
statement, only purchasers acquiring cryptocurrencies from the original holder.123
Consequently, ASIC has recommended that if digital currencies were included in
the financial services regulatory regime, product disclosure obligations would need
to be tailored to clarify that digital currencies do not have an identifiable issuer. 124
IV. Recommended Regulation
A. Declaring Cryptocurrencies to be Financial Products
This Article recommends that cryptocurrencies be listed under section 764A
of the Corporations Act125 as financial products. Expressly declaring
cryptocurrencies to be a category of financial product will provide certainty to
consumers, cryptocurrency exchanges, and entities issuing tokens under ICOs.
Cryptocurrency could be defined using the same definition of “digital currency” in
the AML/CTF Act,126 although the definition must expressly capture tokens issued
for the purposes of investment (investment tokens). Recognition of cryptocurrency
as a distinct category of financial product will also remove the uncertainty of
determining in every instance whether cryptocurrency meets the general
definition of a financial product under section 763A of the Corporations Act. This
approach also avoids classifying a diverse range of tokens as a particular type of
financial product when some tokens under ICOs may be units in a managed
investment scheme, while others may resemble securities or even derivatives. 127
However, there must be a carve-out for utility tokens, which should not be
automatically considered cryptocurrencies. Although it may be challenging to
120.
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characterize utility tokens which may have investment components, the
Corporations Act has already dealt with a facility that has components which
would be considered financial products, and components which would not. The
Corporations Act states that only the components of the facility which are financial
products will be regulated as financial products.128
With respect to regulating utility tokens, the Australian Parliament could
take a similar approach as used with credit facilities. Credit facilities are listed
under section 765A as facilities that are not financial products. 129 The regulations
operate to define credit facilities as not financial products mentioned in
s763A(1)(a).130 If a person makes a financial investment within the meaning of
section 763A(1)(a), then he will acquire a financial product, even if the facility
would otherwise be a credit facility. Essentially, the regulations operate to ensure
that the credit aspects of credit facilities are excluded from regulation while the
investment aspects remain appropriately regulated.131
Similarly, a utility token could be listed under section 765A as a facility that
is not a financial product. The definition of utility token can then expressly exclude
those products which would fall within the meaning of s763A(1)(a). Consequently,
if a person is purchasing a utility token for the purpose of making a financial
investment (as defined in section 763B), then that utility token would be a
financial product.
To clarify the meaning of “making a financial investment” for utility tokens,
this Article recommends that the regulations provide a list of relevant factors for
determining whether a person has made a financial investment in buying utility
tokens. It has been recommended with respect to E.U. law, that utility tokens
offered in an ICO should not be considered securities unless two conditions have
been satisfied: (1) the issuers, through their promotional materials and
communication with investors raise significant expectations of profits; and (2)
most investors buy the specific tokens to sell them for profit and the issuer knows
or ought to have known this.132 It has also been suggested with regards to U.S.
law, that the SEC publish guidance which focuses on objective indicators that the
seller is emphasizing or otherwise advertising a profit potential, including any
affirmative efforts to list a token in regulated U.S. marketplaces prior to the sale
and whether formal waivers or other agreements where token purchasers
affirmatively acknowledged they were not purchasing the tokens for speculative
purposes.133 Both recommendations emphasize that the conduct of the promoter
must be considered for determining if buyers are purchasing utility tokens for
speculative purposes.
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Under Australian law, the meaning of “making a financial investment” has
been interpreted by courts using a subjective test, that is, the actual intentions of
the parties.134 This is reflected in section 763B which indicates one of the factors
in determining if an investor is making a financial investment will be the actual
intentions of the promoter to generate a return for the investor.135 In line with the
above recommendations, this Article recommends that regulations should contain
an objective test for the intentions of the ICO developer/promoter.
As an alternative to where investors are actually buying utility tokens for
speculative purposes (which would satisfy section 763B(a)(ii) 136), the following
factors could be relevant for indicating that a token purchaser is making a
financial investment:
 whether the other person (the promoter/developer) has expressly
communicated the potential for these tokens to be traded at a profit in
secondary markets;
 in the case of tokens bought after an ICO, whether these tokens are
listed on and actively traded on secondary markets;
 the significance of the token’s role for using the platform, and whether
the platform can be operated or used without the token;137 and
 whether, in the particular circumstances, the other person (the
promoter/developer) otherwise ought to have intended that the token be
used to generate a financial return or other benefit for the investor.
For example, upon review of the Canya and Power Ledger white papers, it is
unlikely that an investor would be “making a financial investment” for the tokens
under these ICOs in order to be considered financial products. These white papers
specifically emphasize that investors will choose to list the tokens on
cryptocurrency exchanges at their own risk.138 Canya’s white paper goes one step
further by emphasizing that the tokens issued carry no guarantee, representation
or promise of any return or profitability as to what price the tokens may trade at
in the future.139 The Canya Coins and the POWR tokens function like software
licenses to use the platform, so their respective platforms cannot be used unless
people hold their tokens.140 Therefore, Canya Coins and POWR tokens do not
satisfy any of the above relevant factors, and would be utility tokens excluded as
financial products under section 765A of the Corporations Act.
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B. Amending Disclosure Obligations
Existing product disclosure obligations in the Corporations Act need to be
amended to ensure that all purchasers of cryptocurrencies receive disclosure
documents before or at the time of purchasing cryptocurrency. Consequently,
disclosure obligations should be imposed on (1) the entity standing behind the ICO
at the point of issuance of tokens, and (2) the cryptocurrency exchange when these
tokens are traded on secondary markets.
“The basic mandated disclosures [for cryptocurrencies] should be the same
as for all other securities.141 In order to provide more clarity, this Article
recommends that ASIC issue guidance on content to be specifically included in
prospectuses and product disclosure statements for cryptocurrencies. ASIC’s
guidance can state that it expects that a disclosure document for the issue of
investment tokens under ICOs to:
 clearly describe the rights attached to the tokens;
 publish the code underlying the platform (if it is not open source);
 provide information on how the platform would manage crises, detect
bugs and resolve any vulnerabilities in the code;142
 provide a detailed description of governance issues, such as how the
company will decide whether to add new features to the platform and
how rights or functional aspects of the token may be amended, including
whether the company can unilaterally vary the rights attached to the
token; and
 provide a detailed description of the security measures taken to protect
the platform from cyberattacks.143
It is proposed that cryptocurrency exchanges must provide prospective purchasers
with disclosure documents detailing the key risks of purchasing cryptocurrencies,
in line with the approach taken under New York’s Bitlicense Rules.144 The
BitLicense Rules require that a virtual currency business, “as part of establishing
a relationship with a customer, and prior to entering into a transaction with a
customer,” must “disclose . . . all material risks associated with . . . virtual
currency.”145 The rules then list the minimum information that must be included,
such as “virtual currency is not legal tender,” the “volatility . . . of virtual currency”
which can lead to significant losses, “transactions in virtual currency may be
irreversible, [which can lead] to fraudulent or accidental transactions [which are]
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not recoverable,” and “the nature of virtual currency may lead to an increased risk
of fraud or cyberattack.”146
The Corporations Act should also be amended to ensure that all disclosure
documents for the purchase of cryptocurrencies must be lodged with ASIC before
their release to consumers. Due to the volatile value and high cybersecurity risks
of purchasing cryptocurrency, this Article recommends that ASIC should review
all disclosure documents to ensure maximum protection for consumers.
ASIC recognizes the increasing influence of social media and online investor
forums for providing information about IPOs and stated that it plans to proactively
monitor social media and online forums.147 ASIC should increase its monitoring of
social media and online forums if cryptocurrencies are expressly declared as
financial products, as most sources of information regarding cryptocurrencies will
be published over the Internet.
C. Imposing Security Obligations on Platforms
How can regulation prevent the loss of cryptocurrencies in wallets and
exchanges? And, further, how can security be used to block increasingly
sophisticated hackers?148 Cryptocurrency exchanges are popular targets for
criminals, both outside server breaches and inside theft, since they handle and
store large amounts of cryptocurrencies.149 For this reason, cryptocurrency
exchanges must have ongoing obligations to maintain effective cybersecurity
programs and conduct annual penetration testing and audits of their IT systems.
While ASIC has previously stated that cybersecurity is one of its key focuses, 150
currently it is not a specific condition of AFSL or AML that licensees ensure the
adequacy of their IT systems. Guidance from ASIC states that a duty to ensure
adequate security arrangements to protect their IT systems would form part of an
AML licensee’s duty under section 792A to do all things necessary to ensure that
the market they operate is “fair, orderly and transparent.” 151 However, the ASX
Market Integrity Rules deal with security arrangements specific to electronic
trading by requiring that a market participant’s AOP system has “security
arrangements to monitor for and prevent unauthorized [access] to a gateway or an
open interface device.”152
This Article recommends that ASIC either impose an additional condition
on a cryptocurrency exchange’s AML to maintain an effective cybersecurity
program and annual testing, or obligate the cryptocurrency exchange in new rules
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which specifically apply to secondary cryptocurrency markets. ASIC does have the
power to vary or impose additional conditions on a license holder’s AML or
AFSL;153 however, ASIC usually only takes this action where it has serious
concerns about the licensee or how the licensee’s business is conducted. 154 This
power only imposes an additional condition on each AML holder, and not all AML
holders. It would be more effective then, for ASIC to issue integrity rules for
cryptocurrency markets which would include obligations to take security
measures which are tailored to the nature of cryptocurrency exchanges.
As a starting point, the cybersecurity obligations under the ADCA’s Code of
Conduct could be included in ASIC’s cryptocurrency market integrity rules. These
obligations include that digital currency businesses must, with regards to
customers’ wallet addresses, IP addresses, digital currency identifiers or credit
card information:
 build and maintain a secure network;
 securely store such data and encrypting any transmission of data across
open, public networks;
 maintain a vulnerability management program;
 implement strong access control measures;
 regularly monitor and test networks; and
 maintain an information security policy.155
Additional security obligations which are included in New York’s Bitlicense Rules
are:
 detect attempts at unauthorized access to electronic systems and data;
 “respond to detected [cyberattacks] to mitigate any negative effects; and
 recover from [cyberattacks] and restore normal . . . services.” 156
ASIC’s cryptocurrency market integrity rules could also require cryptocurrencies
to have certified compliance with the globally recognized best practice standard
ISO27001.
In imposing any additional license conditions or developing specific rules
for cryptocurrency exchanges, an appropriate balance must be struck between
consumer protection and encouraging innovation. It should be noted that New
York’s BitLicense Rules have attracted criticism for imposing onerous operational
burdens such as anti-fraud and cybersecurity requirements which have driven
some virtual currency businesses away from operating in New York. 157 However,
given the Australian government’s widely announced fintech priorities such as its
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FinTech regulatory sandbox,158 it is likely that the government will be more than
willing to encourage the growth of cryptocurrency exchanges while appropriately
ensuring consumer protection.
V. Conclusion
ASIC has previously stated that it is not straightforward to regulate digital
currencies like financial products, and to do so would require solving a number of
unique issues associated with digital currencies.159 While that is certainly the
case, the challenges in regulating cryptocurrencies should not be a reason to avoid
regulating them altogether. It has been more than three years since the Senate’s
Economic References Committee recommended that further research be conducted
before designating digital currency as either a foreign currency or a financial
product.160 Since then, cryptocurrencies have gained even more popularity with
exponential rise in value and the introduction of ICOs, raising altogether US$3.2
billion, putting the overall market volume of cryptocurrencies to be in the US$ 200
billion range.161
This Article demonstrates that financial services laws are best suited to
protect Australian consumers against the risks of investing in cryptocurrencies
and tokens issued under ICOs. The Corporations Act can be amended to address
the specific regulatory challenges of cryptocurrencies, recognize cryptocurrencies
as a separate category of financial product, ensure that all purchasers of
cryptocurrencies receive a disclosure statement, and require the entity behind the
ICO and cryptocurrency exchanges to take rigorous security measures. The time
to act is now.
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